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Abstract: The Halting Problem is ill-conceived and ill-defined.
Halting Problem
When  Alan  Turing  laid  the  foundation  for  computation  in  1936  [5],  he  wanted  to  show  what 
computation can do, and what it cannot do.  For the latter, he invented a problem that we now call the 
“Halting Problem”.  In modern terms, it is as follows.
In a general-purpose programming language, write a program that reads a text (character string) 
p  representing a program in that same language, and reads another text  i  representing its input, 
and outputs  true  if execution of  p  with input  i  terminates, and outputs  false  if execution of 
p  with input  i  does not terminate.
The choice of programming language does not matter;  any general-purpose programming language 
will do.  The problem cannot be solved;  there is no such program.
Is the problem well defined?  It certainly sounds well defined.  The input is clear:  two texts.  The first 
text is supposed to represent a program;  whether it does can presumably be determined the same way 
a compiler determines whether its input text represents a program.  The output is clear:  either  true  or 
false .  The criterion for outputting  true  is “execution of  p  with input  i  terminates”, and the criterion 
for outputting  false  is its negation.  What could be clearer?
The  problem  talks  about  a  “program”  to  compute  halting,  but  for  convenience,  without  loss  of 
generality, I will talk about a Pascal function to compute halting.  The problem talks about whether 
execution of a “program” terminates, but for convenience, without loss of generality, I will talk about 
whether execution of a Pascal procedure terminates.  The argument for incomputability begins with the 
assumption,  made  for  the  sake  of  showing  a  contradiction,  that  the  halting  function  can  be 
programmed, and has been programmed;  let's call it  halts .  Then we can write a procedure like this:
procedure diag (s: string);
begin
if halts (s, s) then diag (s)
end
Does execution of  diag ('diag')  terminate?  If it does, then  halts ('diag', 'diag')  should return  true , 
and so we see from the body of procedure  diag  that its execution does not terminate.  If it doesn't 
terminate, then  halts ('diag', 'diag')  should return  false , and so we see from the body of procedure 
diag  that its execution terminates.  We have a contradiction (inconsistency), so we conclude that the 
initial assumption was wrong:  the halting function cannot be programmed;  it is incomputable.
That argument, and its conclusion, are well accepted.  But I have three complaints.  My first complaint 
is small and easily fixed.  My middle complaint is more serious, and casts doubt on the conclusion. 
My final complaint casts doubt on the whole problem.
Domain Problem
Execution of  diag ('diag')  includes function call  halts ('diag', 'diag') .  Function  halts  requires its 
first  argument   'diag'   to  be  a  text  that  represents  a  legal  (syntactically  correct  and type  correct) 
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procedure.  Suppose  diag  is a legal procedure;  then the arguments of  halts  are in their domains, and 
so the call   halts  ('diag',   'diag')   is  legal,  and therefore  diag   is  a  legal  procedure,  as  supposed. 
Suppose  diag  is not a legal procedure;  then the first argument of  halts  is not in its domain, and so 
the call  halts ('diag', 'diag')  is illegal, and therefore  diag  is not a legal procedure, as supposed.  We 
are unable to say whether  diag  is a legal procedure.
The solution to this domain problem is simple and surprising.  Change the Halting Problem as follows.
In a general-purpose programming language, write a program that reads two texts (character 
strings)  p  and  i .  If  p  represents a program in that same language whose execution with input 
i  terminates, then output  true .  If  p  does not represent a program in that same language, or 
represents a program in that same language whose execution with input  i  does not terminate, 
then output  false .
Now the call  halts ('diag', 'diag')  is legal no matter whether  diag  is a legal procedure;  therefore, 
ironically,  diag  is a legal procedure.
Specification Problem
The next problem is more serious.  When we reason about the execution of procedure  diag , how do 
we know what the function call  halts ('diag', 'diag')  will return?  In general, there are two ways.  The 
way preferred by the semantics and verification communities is to examine the program for function 
halts .  The incomputability argument begins with the assumption that we have programmed function 
halts , so that procedure  diag  can call it and it can be executed.  But we do not actually have the 
program for function  halts  for the purpose of examining it to determine what  halts ('diag',  'diag') 
returns.  Under the present circumstance, this way doesn't work.
The other way is to examine the specification of function  halts  as stated in the Halting Problem.  As a 
programmer, I consider that the meaning of a call is always given by its specification, even if the 
program is available.  Under the present circumstance, this is the only possible option, and this is how 
the incomputability proof proceeds.  But we don't need to assume that halting is computable, or that it 
has been programmed, to use the specification in our reasoning.  Without assuming computability, we 
ask what the result of  halts ('diag', 'diag')  should be.  This is a question about the specification of 
halts  .   If  it  should  be   true   ,  then  the  semantics  of   diag  ('diag')   is  nontermination,  so 
halts ('diag', 'diag')  should be  false .  If it should be  false , then the semantics of  diag ('diag')  is 
termination, so it should be  true .  This is inconsistent.  Therefore  halts  cannot be programmed 
according to its inconsistent specification.
It is difficult to see how the  halts  specification could be inconsistent, but the  diag  example shows us 
that  it  is.   We arrive at  the  conclusion that   halts   cannot  be programmed,  but  the reason is  not 
incomputability of a well-defined mathematical function.  The reason is that the specification of the 
halts  function is inconsistent.  The question of computability of a well-defined mathematical function 
has not been addressed.
We could also define
procedure what (s: string);
begin
if not halts (s, s) then what (s)
end
and then ask what the result of  halts  ('what',  'what')   should be.  If  it  should be  true   ,  then the 
semantics of  what ('what')  is termination, so  halts ('what', 'what')  should be  true , as assumed.  If it 
should be  false , then the semantics of  what ('what')  is nontermination, so it should be  false , as 
assumed.  Both answers are acceptable.  Even though the informal specification of  halts  seemed clear, 
it is overdetermined when applied to  diag , and underdetermined when applied to what .
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Meaning Problem
Suppose you buy some software,  and it  comes with  a  guarantee:   all  executions  of  this  software 
terminate, or one million times your money back.  Sounds good.  Under what circumstances can you 
complain that the guarantee has been violated, and demand the promised money?  No matter how long 
the execution has taken, the vendor can say “wait longer”.  There is never a time when you can say that 
the computation has taken forever.  The guarantee of termination is perfectly safe for the vendor, and 
worthless for the buyer.
Suppose you are commissioned to write some software, and the client has specified that all executions 
of the software must terminate.  You can safely ignore this specification for the reason stated in the 
previous paragraph:   the client can never complain that the specification has not been met.  If the 
guarantee, or the specification, had stated a time bound within which the termination must occur, then 
it  cannot  be  ignored because a  violation is  observed when the  time bound is  exceeded.   But  the 
guarantee  and  specification  said  only  “termination”,  without  stating  a  time  bound,  making  them 
worthless.
The philosopher Karl Popper [2] said that a scientific statement is meaningful if and only if
• it makes sense to say that it is true (it is not self-contradictory), and
• it makes sense to say that it is false (it is not a tautology), and
• if it is false, there is a way to show that it is false (its falsity can be observed).
The  fact  that  nontermination  is  unobservable  makes  termination  meaningless,  according  to  this 
philosophy.
In the same vein, according to Shannon's Information Theory [4], a test that cannot fail conveys no 
information.  Similarly, according to Bayesian probability, we cannot confirm something (increase its 
probability) without a test that can potentially disconfirm it (decrease its probability).
I am hesitant to declare what is meaningful and what is meaningless.  But I am prepared to say that if 
there is no possibility to collect on a guarantee, then the guarantee is worthless.  Similarly, if there is 
no possibility to violate a specification, then the specification is worthless.  The halting specification is 
certainly worthless, possibly meaningless.
In some computing models, termination is observable:  it is an event that cannot happen before the end 
of a computation, and must happen at its end.  In these models, nontermination is a worthwhile claim 
or guarantee or specification.  For many applications, such as the control of a nuclear power plant, or a 
heart pacemaker, it is essential that execution of the software not terminate.
In other models of computation, termination is not a computation event, but the end of or cessation of 
computation events.  In these models, termination is unobservable because you can never be sure that 
the computation events have ceased.  Promising or specifying nontermination, in these models, is as 
worthless as promising or specifying termination.
I have been discussing the worthlessness of specifying termination based on our inability to observe 
nontermination when executing a program.  It may seem there is another way to approach the problem: 
analyze,  rather  than  execute,  the  program.   This  is  particularly  relevant  for  the  Halting  Problem; 
function  halts  is given the text of a program for analysis.  If you want to prove termination, or prove 
nontermination, the proof is conducted within a theory, which provides the axioms and proof rules 
used in the proof.  So we need a theory of programming, and four spring to mind:
• Hoare Logic [1], the original 1969 theory of programming. pre- postconditions, invariants, variants.
• Unroll loops and recursions, form a sequence of finite approximations to the behavior, and then take 
the limit.
• Write recursive equations, then find the least fixed-point solution (the least deterministic solution).
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• My own theory of programming (aPToP) [0].  The meaning of a function or procedure call is the 
function or procedure specification, not the function or procedure body.  A loop is syntactic sugar for 
a recursive call, and the meaning of that call is the loop specification, not the loop body.  You don't 
need to find an invariant;  you don't need to form a sequence of approximations;  you don't need to 
calculate a fixed-point.
These theories have different strengths, roughly increasing in the order listed.  If ever two theories 
disagree  about  what  happens  when  a  program  is  executed,  we  would  arbitrate  by  executing  the 
program, observe what happens, and throw away the theory that's wrong.  The correctness (soundness, 
validity) of a theory is decided by observation of execution, so proof does not dispense with the need 
for observation.  Fortunately, whenever these theories say something that can be observed about a 
computation, they agree.
Unfortunately,  these  four  theories  disagree  about  questions  of  termination.   The  sequence  of 
approximations even gives different answers when different index sets are used for the sequence.  Yet 
all these theories are sound because they differ about things that are not observable.  Furthermore, all 
sound  theories  are  incomplete  concerning  questions  of  termination:   for  each  theory,  there  are 
programs whose termination status cannot be decided by the theory.  The Halting Problem, which asks 
for a program (in some programming language) to determine the halting status of all programs (in that 
same language), is ill-defined by failing to say according to which theory, and is inconsistent by asking 
for both soundness and completeness.
I have questioned the meaningfulness or worth of specifying termination without a time bound, but I 
expect many people will cling to the feeling that it is meaningful and worthwhile.  I now introduce you 
to calumation, a word that is not in any dictionary, and is absolutely meaningless.  The Calumation 
Problem is:
In a general-purpose programming language, write a program that reads two texts (character 
strings)  p  and  i .  If  p  represents a program in that same language whose execution with input 
i  calumates, then output  true .  If  p  does not represent a program in that same language, or 
represents a program in that same language whose execution with input  i  does not calumate, 
then output  false .
To “prove” that calumation is incomputable, all we need is one positive example, and one negative 
example.  So let's say that  P  is a procedure whose execution calumates, and  N  is a procedure whose 
execution does not calumate.  Assume, for the sake of showing a contradiction, that the calumation 
function can be programmed, and has been programmed;  let's call it  cal  .   Then we can write a 
procedure like this:
procedure caldiag (s: string);
begin
if cal (s, s) then N else P
end
Does execution of  caldiag ('caldiag')  calumate?  If it does, then  cal ('caldiag', 'caldiag')  should 
return  true , and so we see from the body of procedure  caldiag  that its execution does not calumate. 
If it doesn't calumate, then  cal ('caldiag', 'caldiag')  should return  false , and so we see from the body 
of procedure  caldiag  that its execution calumates.  We have a contradiction (inconsistency).  If we 
accept  the  standard  argument  for  the  incomputability  of  halting,  we  must  now conclude  that  the 
calumation function cannot be programmed;  it is incomputable.
We thus “prove” that the meaningless calumation function is incomputable exactly the same way we 
“prove” that halting is incomputable [3].  In my opinion, a “proof” that proves a completely undefined 
function to be incomputable is suspicious.
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Conclusion
Termination without a time bound is a worthless property, whether as a guarantee or as a specification 
(some  would  even  say  meaningless).  The  Halting  Problem,  which  asks  for  a  program  (in  some 
programming language) to determine the halting status of all programs (in that same programming 
language),  is  ill-defined  by  failing  to  say  according  to  which  theory  the  halting  status  should  be 
determined.   But  the  meaning  of  “halting”  doesn't  matter,  because  the  “proof”  that  halting  is 
incomputable  has  nothing  to  do  with  halting;   it  works  just  as  well  (or  badly)  “proving”  that  a 
meaningless property is incomputable.  That is because the “proof” actually shows an inconsistency in 
the specification that is independent of the property.
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